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Recent Decisions
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PATENT LAW-INTERFERENCES-The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the quantum of
proof for priority is clear and convincing evidence, and that corrob-
oration of inventor's testimony will be evaluated by the "rule of
reason."
Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Richard C. Price ("Price") appealed a decision of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("Board") that awarded the patent in question in
Patent Interference Count No. 102,101 to Dale R. Symsek ("Sym-
sek") and Nancy P. Regelin .("Regelin").1 Symsek and Regelin, en-
gineers for the American Bridge Division of the United States
Steel Corporation, were issued United States Patent No. 4,628,869
("the '869 patent") for a "Variable Temperature Waste Heat Re-
covery System," which was subsequently assigned to U. S. Steel.2
Nearly one year after the patent was issued, Price filed United
States Patent Application Serial No. 07/131,859 which copied
claims from the '869 patent and provoked the interference' The
invention in question is an improved process for recovering and
using heat that is generated in a process heater and normally dissi-
pated without being redirected for useful application, thus improv-
ing the efficiency of the system as a whole.4
1. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
2. Price, 988 F.2d at 1189.
3. Id. An interference is an action declared whenever a patent application would
interfere with another pending. application or with a granted patent. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1988).
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences determines the question of priority and may
determine patentability. Id. A claim that interferes with an issued patent must be made
within one year after the date on which the patent was granted. Id.
4. Price, 988 F.2d at 1189-90. In the usual closed-loop heat recovery system, a ther-
mal fluid becomes heated in a first heat exchanger by exhaust gas as the gas exits a process
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Price submitted affidavits and depositions intending to show
that he conceived this process before Symsek and that Symsek de-
rived the invention from him.5 In the alternative, Price sought to
prove that because he conceived the system prior to conception by
Symsek, and was reasonably diligent in reducing the invention to
practice, he was thus entitled to an award of priority of invention.'
The Board required Price to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
of the elements necessary to establish either priority or derivation,
heater. Id. at 1189. This heated fluid then leaves the first heat exchanger and travels to a
second heat exchanger, where it transfers some of its heat to combustion gases before these
gases enter the process heater, thus increasing the efficiency of the burners. Id. If there is
any variance in-the temperature of the exhaust gases, for example in a variable cycle unit,
then the temperature of the thermal fluid will vary, the heat transferred to the incoming
combustion gas varies, and the process loses efficiency. Id. The invention in the count at
issue places a large-volume reservoir on the downstream side of the first exchanger and on
the upstream side of the second heat exchanger. Id. The thermal fluid then passes from the
first heat exchanger into this reservoir, which contains a large volume of equilibrium (or
nearly so) temperature fluid, and then fluid from this reservoir travels to the second heat
exchanger to preheat the combustion gases. Id. The effect of this reservoir (which has a
larger volume than the rest of the closed system) is to send a fairly constant temperature
fluid to the second heat exchanger, so the amount of heat transferred to preheat the com-
bustion gases remains relatively constant. Id. This tends to improve the efficiency of the
process. Id. at 1190.
5. Id. Prior conception is an important concept because a valid patent cannot be
granted to an applicant if the invention had been previously conceived by another, if the
other was diligent in reducing the invention to practice. 35 U.S.C. §102(g) (1988). Concep-
tion has been defined as "the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act."
Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (affirming award of priority to the
junior party based on the inability of the senior party to corroborate conception). All that
remains after conception is construction, not invention. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 359. The for-
mation in the inventor's mind of the idea of a complete and operative invention is concep-
tion within the patent law. Id. Derivation is important because a valid patent cannot be
granted to one who did not invent the subject matter sought to be patented (e.g., a stolen
idea). 35 U.S.C. §102(0 (1988).
6. Reduction to practice is another important concept because although one may
have been the first to conceive the invention, if he is not diligent in reducing the invention
to practice, the first inventor's priority may be defeated. 35 U.S.C. §102(g) (1988). It is a
long-standing rule that a delay of great length in activity on the subject matter of the inven-
tion may bar the first inventor from using an early reduction to practice as a defense in a
contest of his priority. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that while
too long of a delay in reduction to practice may bar the first inventor from priority, if the
first inventor resumes work on the invention prior to the initiation of work by the second
inventor, the first inventor may rely on the resumed work for priority). Reduction to prac-
tice is a term of art that entails successful testing of the invention. Wolter v. Belicka, 409
F.2d 255, 262-63 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (Rich, J., dissenting) (reviewing the definition of reduc-
tion to practice where the majority held that the junior party did not successfully reduce the
in' ention to practice). Reduction to practice occurs when the invention's "workability" is
shown. Wolter, 409 F.2d at 263. "Workability" indicates that a functional, tangible con-
struction of the invention has been completed. Id. It is not necessary that the construction
operate flawlessly, just that it will perform its intended use beyond probability of failure. Id.
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and awarded the patent to Symsek when Price failed to meet this
standard of proof.'
Price appealed this decision, asserting that the Board committed
legal error by requiring him to prove prior conception, communica-
tion, and diligent reduction to practice by the criminal standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt.8 He also argued that the Board erred
in refusing to consider documentary evidence to show priority,
even though the date of existence of the document was corrobo-
rated by a witness.9
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified that the
issue of the quantum of proof necessary to show priority in an in-
terference with an issued patent was a question of first impression
in the Federal Circuit.10 The court stated that the United States
Supreme Court has characterized the three standards of proof gen-
erally recognized as "preponderance of the evidence" as used in
most civil cases, "clear and convincing evidence" reserved to those
civil cases in which it is necessary to preserve particularly impor-
tant interests, and "beyond a reasonable doubt" as applicable to
criminal cases.11 This court recognized that the Supreme Court has
7. Price, 988 F.2d at 1190. The elements of a priority action include a showing that
the challenging party was the first to conceive and to reduce the invention to practice within
a reasonable time after conception. Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding
that the junior party was not entitled to prevail in a priority action because he had sup-
pressed or concealed the invention within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §102(g) (1988)). In a
derivation proceeding, the party alleging derivation must show prior, complete conception of
the invention and communication of this conception to the deriving party. Hedgewick v.
Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that the junior party did not meet the
burden of proving derivation). The communication must be such as would allow one skilled
in the art to fabricate and operate the invention. Hedgewick, 497 F.2d at 908.
8. Price, 988 F.2d at 1190-91.
9. Id. at 1190.
10. Id. at 1191. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a thirteenth court of
appeals created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPY-
RIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 199 (rev. 3d ed. 1993). It is an
Article III court and has twelve judges appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Id. It combines the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
the Court of Claims. Id. In its first session, it adopted the decisions of those courts as prece-
dents of its own. Id. As opposed to the other courts of appeals, this court's jurisdiction is
defined by subject matter, instead of geography. Id. It was created to eradicate the wide
diversity of standards applied to patent cases by the circuits. Id. The Federal Circuit has
the patent jurisdiction formerly a part of the twelve circuit courts of appeals. Id. at 365.
This has eliminated forum shopping and conflict between the circuits and has strengthened
the grant of patents by giving new force to the presumption of validity and bolstering the
procedural and remedial relief available to owners of patents. Id. One study has shown that
between 1945 and 1957, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits held about 40% of the patents that
came before the courts valid, while the Second Circuit held only 4.8% valid. Id. at 377.
11. Price, 988 F.2d at 1191 (citing California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa
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never required a party in a civil suit to meet the burden of "be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 12 The court reiterated that the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard requires a more demanding
burden of proof than does the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, but imposes a less onerous burden than the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard.13
The court invoked the "social disutility" analysis introduced by
Justice Harlan in In re Winship,14 in which the standard of proof
used reflects a fundamental evaluation of the social costs, or "disu-
tility," of inaccurate factual determinations. 15 The court noted that
the Supreme Court has habitually applied this "social disutility"
analysis when a question arises regarding the appropriate burden
of proof.'6 The court considered that earlier decisions in which the
Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981) (holding that the United States Constitution does not
require the imposition of the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt to a civil ob-
scenity case)). See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (finding that the
standard for commitment because of a mental illness was more than a mere preponderance,
but less than beyond a reasonable doubt, and defining the three standards of proof).
12. Price, 988 F.2d at 1191. But see Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 522 (1922)
(applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in a workman's compensation case);
Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 134 (1889) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard with respect to an oral agreement in a property conveyance suit); cf. Fidelity Mut. Life
Ass'n. v. Mottler, 185 U.S. 308, 317 (1902) (stating that if a criminal act is asserted, the rule
of reasonable doubt is applicable to establish that act).
13. Price, 988 F.2d at 1191.
14. 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that the beyond reason-
able doubt standard applied to criminal law has support in the United States Constitution).
15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370. This social disutility analysis recognizes that (1)
factfinders rarely attain exact knowledge of the event-achievement of a belief of what hap-
pened is typically the best that can be realized, and (2) sometimes the factfinder will not
reach the correct factual conclusion, no matter how assiduous the attempt to arrive at the
truth. Id. In a criminal suit, there are two possible outcomes of an erroneous determination
of the facts-either a guilty man will be set free or an innocent man will be found guilty. Id.
at 370-71. If the burden of proof were merely a preponderance of the evidence, then there
would be a far smaller risk of freeing guilty parties, but the likelihood of punishing an inno-
cent person would be great. Id. at 371. The standard of proof to be used affects the fre-
quency of each of these types of inaccurate consequences; therefore, the choice of standard
to be applied should reflect an evaluation of the relative social disutility of each outcome.
Id. When the standards of proof are viewed in this light, the reasons for the different stan-
dards of proof between a criminal and a civil case become clear. Id. In a civil suit for dam-
ages, it is no more serious for an error to go in favor of the plaintiff than for an error to go in
favor of the defendant. Id. Therefore, the preponderance of the evidence standard seems
particularly appropriate for civil cases. Id. at 371-72. Society, however, does not view the
disutility of convicting an innocent party as the same as the disutility of the acquittal of a
guilty party. Id. at 372.
16. Price, 988 F.2d at 1193. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55
(1982) (applying the disutility analysis to determine the minimum burden of proof neces-
sary for termination of parental rights); California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa
Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1981) (employing the disutility analysis to aid in the
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standard of proof was recited as "beyond a reasonable doubt" were
not made as a result of a reasoned analysis that the highest degree
of proof was necessary to protect a valued societal interest.17 The
court decided that the evidentiary standard of clear and convinc-
ing evidence suffices for the patent interest at stake, for which the
opponent must establish priority by highly persuasive evidence
that leads to a "thorough conviction in one's mind of the truth of
the challenger's position."" In an interference proceeding, the
court stated, the societal interest to protect a patent that has al-
ready been issued is derived from the presumption of the validity
of a patent, and this interest warrants a higher standard than a
preponderance of the evidence. 19 Thus, the court concluded, the
correct standard to be applied is the clear and convincing evidence
standard.2
The court noted, however, that although Price should not have
been required to meet the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt,
it is well settled in case law that an inventor's testimony regarding
priority or derivation of the invention, standing alone, is not suffi-
cient to satisfy the standard of clear and convincing evidence.2'
The challenger's oral testimony has historically been regarded with
skepticism,22 and this testimony requires the support of cor-
determination of the proper standard of proof for a civil obscenity case); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (applying the disutility analysis in determining the proper
standard of proof for commitment due to mental illness).
17. Price, 988 F.2d at 1193. See, e.g., Horwath v. Lee, 564 F.2d 948, 949 n.2 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (applying the beyond reasonable doubt standard when an interference is filed after
the issuance of a patent); Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 596 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975) (requiring the challenging party to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that it recognized that it had developed a new form of ampicillin); Wolter v. Belicka,
409 F.2d 255, 256 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that the junior party must demonstrate re-
duction to practice beyond a reasonable doubt); Walker v. Altorfer, 111 F.2d 164, 165
(C.C.P.A. 1940) (holding that the junior party must prove priority beyond a reasonable
doubt).
18. Price, 988 F.2d at 1193.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1194.
21. Id.; See, e.g., Reese v. Hurst, 661 F.2d 1222, 1225 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that
the junior party must provide independent corroboration of reduction to practice); Mergen-
thaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264 (D.C. Cir. 1897) (holding that witnesses who derive their
knowledge of the invention from the inventor, absent actually witnessing the invention, do
not provide adequate corroboration of reduction to practice of the invention).
22. See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 60
(1923) (recognizing the ease with which honest witnesses can convince themselves that they
had a conception of the basis of a valuable patent before the inventor to whom the patent is
granted, and that this phenomenon is well-recognized in this branch of law, thus necessitat-
ing a requirement of clear and satisfactory evidence of such conception); Washburn & Moen
Mfg. Co. v. Beat 'Em All Barbed-Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275, 285 (1892) (discussing how with
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roborating evidence.23 Without this corroboration, the court held,
an alleged inventor's testimony does not satisfy the "clear and con-
vincing evidence" standard necessary to overcome the presumption
of validity of an issued patent.2" Consequently, the court observed,
the outcome of a case often depends on which inventor has the
burden of proof.
25
The court found that the Board in this case correctly put the
burden on Price, the junior party.26 However, the court considered
that the Board's application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard resulted in an untenable requirement of corroboration. 2
The Board found that the date of conception of the invention by
Symsek was early February 1983. 28 Price did not contest this date,
but offered evidence to prove his conception of the invention
before that date.29 The court held that in order to prove priority,
conception by a challenging inventor cannot be proven solely by
his uncorroborated testimony or mere allegation; disclosure to
others or depiction of the invention in some clearly tangible form,
such as drawings or models, with an adequate showing of identity
in point of time, is necessary for corroboration." The court recog-
nized that if this were not the case, mere allegation of priority
would virtually prevent the adverse party from rebutting the alle-
gation, thus offering great temptation of perjury to establish prior-
ity.3 To aid the inquiry, a "rule of reason" analysis was applied by
the court to determine the corroboration of the inventor's prior
conception testimony.32 This entails an evaluation of all germane
every important patent, like the cotton gin and barbed wire, there have been those who
"imagined" that they had invented the subject matter before the patentee, and how this use
of the imagination has thrown discredit on uncorroborated testimony by an inventor).
23. Price, 988 F.2d at 1194. See Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(affirming award of priority to the junior party based on the inability of the senior party to
corroborate conception).
24. Price, 988 F.2d at 1194.
25. Id.
26. Id. Symsek was entitled to the presumption of validity of the patent. Id. at 1193.
27. Id. at 1194.
28. Id.
29. Price, 988 F.2d at 1195. This evidence consisted of, inter alia, affidavits and testi-
mony from the Secretary of Price Industries and from two American Bridge engineers who
were involved in the project. Id. at 1195-96 & n.4. Evidence was also introduced that was
intended to show that Symsek and Regelin were neophytes in the field and could not have
invented the system without the disclosure by Price. Id. at 1196 n.4.
30. Id. at 1194-95 (citing Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 278 (D.C. Cir.
1897)).
31. Price, 988 F.2d at 1194.
32. Id. at 1195. An "equitable rule of reason" is used to permit courts to avoid a rigid
Vol. 32:149
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evidence by the court so that the credibility of the prior conception
evidence can be reliably determined."3 The court decided that the
Board imposed the corroboration requirement to an unreasonable
extent.34
Price presented several exhibits to show prior conception in sup-
port of his affidavit. 35 An affidavit from the Corporate Secretary of
Price Industries ("Secretary") was submitted that corroborated the
date of a drawing made of the invention as before the conception
date of Symsek.36 The Board held that this affidavit was not suffi-
cient corroboration because the Secretary did "not attribute the
drawing to the applicant Price or indicate that she had any under-
standing of its content or that anyone explained the significance of
the drawing to her."'37 The court held that the Board erred in re-
quiring a drawing to have corroborating evidence as to its con-
tent.3 8 The court said that corroboration is not necessary to show
the content of a drawing; corroboration is merely necessary to sup-
port the inventor's testimony.3 9 If the Secretary's affidavit were be-
lieved, remarked the court, it would support the contention that
application of a statute when it would repress the very creativity the law was designed to
further. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (acknowledging the copyright law fair
use doctrine as an example of rule of reason). The rule of reason was developed over the
years to ease the burden of corroboration; it is usually applied with respect to actual reduc-
tion to practice. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (employing the rule of
reason to determine if sufficient corroboration for conception by the senior party exists).
The rule exhorts a rational evaluation of all pertinent evidence to determine the credibility
of the inventor's testimony. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 360. This rule, however, does not elimi-
nate the need for independent corroboration. Id.
33. Price, 988 F.2d at 1195. See Coleman, 754 F.2d at 360. Factors that are relevant
to the inventor's credibility are:
(1) delay between the event and the trial, (2) interest of corroborating witnesses, (3)
contradiction or impeachment, (4) corroboration, (5) the corroborating witnesses' fa-
miliarity with details of alleged prior structure, (6) improbability of prior use consid-
ering the state of the art, (7) impact of the invention on the industry, and (8) rela-
tionship between witness and alleged prior user.
In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 1021 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding a patent invalid because of
obviousness, but evaluating the credibility of a challenging inventor's oral testimony).
34. Price, 988 F.2d at 1195.
35. Id. One such exhibit was a drawing purportedly made by Price before the date of
conception by Symsek that illustrated the invention and was part of a proposal package that
was prepared by Price and submitted to Bethlehem Steel for consideration as part of a blast
furnace system. Id.
36. Id. at 1195.
37. Id.
38. Id. Evidence of what the drawing would signify to one who is skilled in the art
would be relevant to evaluate the drawing; however, the content itself of the drawing needs
no corroboration. Id. at 1195-96.
39. Price, 988 F.2d at 1195.
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the drawing made by Price, depicting the invention in question,
was drafted before the conception date of Symsek."°
The court went on to express that even if none of the evidence
presented would, by itself, be sufficient to show "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" of the derivation or prior conception, it would be
sufficient if the picture painted by the collective evidence taken as
a whole was such that the Board would have "an abiding convic-
tion" that the prior conception was "highly probable."' 1 The court
vacated the Board's decision and remanded with instruction to
evaluate all of the evidence as a whole under the clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard. 2
An issued patent carries with it a presumption of validity.4s It
has been said that in an infringement suit, the presumption of this
validity is so strong that the burden of proof is on the party chal-
lenging the patent on the basis of prior invention and "every rea-
sonable doubt should be resolved against him." 44 The context in
cases that use this and like phrases suggests that the courts were
not defining a precise standard of proof, but were "offering counsel
and suggestion to guide the course of judgment.' The one theme
common to the variety of expressions of the burden of proof placed
on the assailant of the validity of a patent is that it is that party
bearing the onerous burden of persuasion, and that party will fail
if its evidence does not amount to more than a preponderance.'6
40. Id. at 1196. The Secretary testified that retention of such drawings was a regular
business practice, and she remembered seeing this specific drawing almost a year before
Symsek's conception date of February 1983. Id. The Board rejected her testimony for lack
of sufficiency, not for lack of credibility. Id.
41. Id. See Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(describing clear and convincing evidence in a patent infringement suit); Colorado v. New
Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (holding that in an action alleging diversion of interstate
water, the clear and convincing evidence standard should be used, instead of a mere prepon-
derance, and defining that standard to mean that the proponent must place in the factfinder
"an abiding conviction" of the high probability of the truth of the factual contentions).
42. Price, 988 F.2d at 1196.
43. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7 (1934).
44. Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1886) (holding that "every reasonable
doubt should be resolved against" the infringing party attempting to prove prior use or want
of novelty). See also Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. 120 (1873) (holding that the burden of proof
rests upon the defendant in an infringement case regarding a patent on door locks, and that
"every reasonable doubt should be resolved against him"); Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v.
Beat 'Em All Barbed-Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275, 285 (1892) (citing Coffin v. Ogden as the
source of the rule that every reasonable doubt should be resolved against the defendant in
an infringement suit).
45. Radio Corp. of Am., 293 U.S. at 8 (analyzing previous infringement cases in which




The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, a predecessor of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, had on numerous occa-
sions spoken of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in patent inter-
ference cases. 7 These decisions, however, were delivered before the
Supreme Court clearly delineated the standards of proof, with its
admonition against the use of "beyond a reasonable doubt" in
other than a criminal case.' 8 After the Supreme Court clearly de-
fined the standards of proof,4 9 the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals changed the elicitation of the standard of
proof to indicate that the provoker of a patent interference must
prove prior invention by clear and convincing evidence.5 0 Also, the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard has consistently been
implemented by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-
garding priority and derivation in infringement suits between pri-
vate parties.51 There is no reason that the rule for the burden of
proof in an infringement case should be different than that for an
interference case. 2
Marathon Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. 53 held that if
the interference is between two pending applications, as opposed
to a pending application and an issued patent, as in the instant
case, then the correct burden of proof would be a preponderance of
the evidence.5 4 This same case 55 held the proper standard of proof
for an interference between an application and an issued patent to
be clear and convincing evidence, based on the discussion of Jus-
tice Cardozo in Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Lab-
47. Price, 988 F.2d at 1192. See cases cited at note 17.
48. Price, 988 F.2d at 1192. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See note 11.
49. California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93
(1981) (generally defining the three standards of proof in a civil obscenity case). See note 11
and accompanying text.
50. In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015, 1021 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
51. Price, 988 F.2d at 1192. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1559-60 & 1562-64 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the proper burden in
an infringement suit is clear and convincing evidence). Infringement of a patent occurs
whenever one, without authority, makes, uses, or sells the patented invention within the
United States within the term of the patent. 35 U.S.C. §271 (1988). An interference occurs
when a patent application is filed that contains subject matter patented, or pending, within
the previous year. 35 U.S.C. §135 (1988). See note 3.
52. Langevin v. Nicolson, 110 F.2d 687, 694 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (applying the evidence
rules of prior infringement proceedings to an interference proceeding).
53. 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 520 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (discussing how the timing of the in-
terference, before or after the issuance of a patent, affects the applicable burden of proof).
54. Marathon Oil, 205 U.S.P.Q. at 526.
55. Id.
1993
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oratories.5 6 The social disutility analysis of Justice Harlan in In re
Winship,"' would not yield the same result because there would be
no presumption of validity for either party's claim. 8
The history of the standard of proof used in interference pro-
ceedings shows that there was little uniform application among
courts (and sometimes even in the same court) .5  The Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, which created the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the federal appellate
court for patent questions, clearly enabled the Price court to rec-
tify the inconsistent application of the standard of proof by diverse
courts that once decided patent cases.6 0
Mergenthaler v. Scudder61 is often cited as establishing the pro-
position that an inventor's testimony may not, standing alone, be
sufficient to establish priority. 2 Since then, the courts have recog-
56. 293 U.S. 1 (1934). At the time of Marathon (1979), the Supreme Court had not
yet clearly delineated the standards of proof in California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.'
Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1981), and specified that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard did not apply to civil cases. Radio Corp. of Am. recognized the confusion at that
time (1934) in the standards of proof in similar cases and reasoned that the common core
running through these types of cases was that more than a mere preponderance was neces-
sary to refute the presumption of validity of an issued patent. Radio Corp. of Am., 293 U.S.
at 8.
57. 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring). See note 15 and accompanying
text.
58.. Radio Corp. of Am., 293 U.S. 1, established the principle that an issued patent
carries the presumption of validity.
59. The standards of beyond a reasonable doubt, see, e.g., Horwath v. Lee, 564 F.2d
948, 949 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (applying the beyond reasonable doubt standard when an inter-
ference is filed after the issuance of a patent); Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 596 n. 5
(C.C.P.A. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975) (requiring the challenging party to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that it recognized that it had developed a new form of ampicil-
lin); and clear and convincing evidence, see, e.g., Amax Fly Ash Corp. v. United States, 514
F.2d 1041 (Ct. of Cl. 1975) (requiring the government to prove derivation by clear and con-
vincing evidence); Acme Highway Products Corp. v. D. S. Brown Co., 431 F.2d 1074 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 956 (1971) (requiring defendant in an infringement action
to prove joint inventorship by clear and convincing evidence), have both been invoked in
determining interferences.
60. See discussion at note 10 regarding the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
61. 11 App. D.C. 264 (D.C. Cir. 1897) (involving an interference regarding patent ap-
plications for a line-typing machine).
62. E.g., Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353 (Fed. Cir. 1985). If one could simply claim
that he first conceived an invention, there could be many who would perjure themselves to
chance convincing a jury that they were really the first to conceive, and, thus, are entitled to
the benefits of the patent. Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 278. This assertion could essen-
tially preclude the true first inventor from effective rebuttal. Id. The decision could devolve
into one inventor's word against another-possibly attractive odds for some to claim
priority.
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nized that, in a decision of priority of invention, an inventor's tes-
timony must be corroborated to provide sufficient evidence to find
in the inventor's favor." The basis for this rule is the public policy
to prevent fraud in acquiring a patent." In Petrie v. DeSchwein-
itz,6 the court used the Mergenthaler reasoning to require corrob-
oration in an interference case.66 The court held that a witness'
testimony relating to what the plaintiff (the inventor provoking the
interference) said to him about what the plaintiff did or was going
to do may be sufficient tb show conception, but was not sufficient
to show actual reduction to practice.17 Because none of the wit-
nesses saw the actual performance by the plaintiff of the process in
question, the testimony of these witnesses did not corroborate the
plaintiff's statements of reduction to practice,6 and his unsup-
ported claim was insufficient to establish the fact. 9 The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals used the language of the Petrie deci-
sion in Kear v. Roder,70 in which the appellant attempted to prove
reduction to practice by way of third-party testimony and refer-
ences to documentation from the relevant time period.7 1 The docu-
mentation included the appellant's notebook and time cards."" The
court characterized this documentation as "self-serving declara-
tions," and, thus, insufficient as corroboration.7
A few years later, the same court restated the ruling of Kear in
Thurston v. Wulff.74 In this case, the Board found the deposition
testimony of a witness called by plaintiff to be inadequate with
respect to identification of a newly-synthesized compound; there-
fore, it was insufficient to establish a reduction to practice of the
subject of the patent.7 5 Before the appeals court, the plaintiff ar-
gued that in a large well-conducted laboratory, where well-kept
63. Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 278.
64. See, e.g., Berry v. Webb, 412 F.2d 261, 267 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (basing a split award
of priority in an interference proceeding partially on the basis for the corroboration
requirement).
65. 19 App. D.C. 386 (D.C.Cir. 1902).
66. Petrie, 19 App. D.C. at 389.
67. Id. at 388-89.
68. The witnesses' "knowledge" was based upon what Petrie had said, not what the
witnesses ob., -. ved or independently knew; thus, the reliability of their testimony was inade-
quate. Id.
69. Id.
70. 115 F.2d 810 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
71. Kear, 115 F.2d at 818.
72. Id. at 813.
73. Id. at 817.
74. 164 F.2d 612 (C.C.P.A. 1947).
75. Thurston, 164 F.2d at 614-15.
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books and records are maintained, there is little opportunity for
fraud to be perpetrated, and, thus, little likelihood that the inven-
tor's testimony and records would involve perjury. 76 Therefore, it
was argued, the plaintiff's testimony required no corroboration."
The court refused to eliminate the corroboration requirement and
stated that corroborating evidence could not consist of "self-serv-
ing documents prepared by him or under his direction," and could
also not be based upon information received from the inventor. 78
Between Petrie and Thurston, there occurred a progression from
a rejection, as corroborating evidence, of unverifiable testimony re-
garding oral communications (Petrie) to ab initio denial of any
weight to research notebooks (contemporaneous documents)
(Thurston).7 9 This progression transpired largely without critical
inquiry and sometimes resulted in a mechanical approach to deter-
mining the credibility of proffered corroboration.8"
Analysis of corroboration entails a rational evaluation of all evi-
dence concerning the inventor's claims.8" More recently, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have employed a "rule of
reason" to ease the requirement of corroboration of the testimony
of the inventor.82 This "rule of reason" is inconsistent with the
mechanical disposition of the evidentiary issue presented by the
notebook in Thurston.83 The goal of corroboration is to prove by
evidence not subject to falsification or fabrication that the inventor
reduced the invention to practice.84
In Berry v. Webb,8" the Board rejected the plaintiff's patent
claim as uncorroborated because the evidence offered as corrobora-
tion was the plaintiff's research notebook. 6 The court rejected the
Board's decision and reasoned somewhat differently than prior
holdings.87 Keeping the purpose of the corroboration rule in mind
76. Id. at 617.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Reese v. Hurst, 661 F.2d 1222, 1240 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (an-
alyzing the history and purpose of the corroboration requirement with respect to the rule of
reason).
80. Reese, 661 F.2d at 1240.
81. Id. at 1225.
82. Id. See notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text.
83. Reese, 661 F.2d at 1240 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
84. Gianladis v. Kass, 324 F.2d 322, 325 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
85. 412 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
86. Berry, 412 F.2d at 266.
87. Reese, 661 F.2d at 1241 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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(to prevent fraud), the court looked at all of the facts of the ap-
peal. ss The research notebook was a contemporaneous record of an
organized research effort.8 It would not have been reasonable to
imagine that the plaintiff had in mind the present interference ac-
tion when he was recording the experiments s" Plaintiff's labora-
tory partner also testified to having observed the experiments, un-
derstood the results, and witnessed the maintenance of the
notebook."' This established the existence and maintenance of the
notebook; the court held that to require more corroboration would
not serve to further dispel the chance of fraud.2
The analysis of the Berry court took two significant departures
from previous reasoning.93 First, the court lessened the weight
given to any potential motivation of the appellant to distort the
results of experiments recorded years before the present contro-
versy.9' Second, the certification at the time of the recording in the
notebook (by a separate signature in the notebook) by the witness
who understood the results was seen as reliable corroboration of
the authenticity (not the accuracy) of the notebook and its con-
tents.9 5 Similar application of the rule of reason, evaluating the
surrounding circumstances to determine reliability of the proffered
corroboration, can be seen in other decisions of the time.96
Use of this "rule of reason," however, has not eliminated the re-
quirement that evidence supporting the inventor's testimony may
not depend solely on the inventor.9 7 This rule is not to be used to
eliminate requirements of the law; it is only to be used to deter-
mine the evidence necessary for corroboration of the interfering in-
ventor's testimony.
9 8
By holding that an inventor provoking an interference need only
88. Reese, 661 F.2d at 1241.




93. Reese, 661 F.2d at 1241 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Id. An unwitnessed laboratory notebook was not considered adequate corroborat-
ing evidence in Gortatowsky v. Anwar, 442 F.2d 970 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
96. See, e.g., Ritter v. Rohm & Haas Co., 271 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (uphold-
ing patent validity in an infringement action); Cleeton v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 343 F.Supp.
1215 (D.Md. 1972) (holding patents invalid for obviousness in an infringement action); An-
derson v. Pieper, 442 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (awarding patent to junior party in an inter-
ference action). See note 33 which discusses some of the factors that are relevant to deter-
mining the inventor's credibility.
97. Reese, 661 F.2d at 1230.
98. Id. at 1230-31.
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present evidence to meet the "clear and convincing" standard of
proof, and interpreting the "rule of reason" to allow corroboration
of a drawing by one who does not understand the subject matter in
dispute, it may appear as if the court in the instant action is loos-
ening the standards by which one will prevail in an interference
action. The court, however, took this opportunity to review the law
of interferences, as established by this and predecessor courts, in
light of the more recent holdings of the Supreme Court." The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did its job by reconciling
what appeared to be conflicting law regarding patent interference
issues as handed down by diverse courts.100
Ironically, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may have
resolved the issue of the burden of proof and corroboration of the
inventor's testimony in a patent interference case just in time to
see the patent interference system, as presently administered, dis-
appear in the United States. The patent interference process stems
from the concept that the patent should be issued to the first to
invent. °1 The United States and the Philippines are the' only
countries that use the first-to-invent system.0 2 The rest of the
world uses a first-to-file system.103 In a first-to-file system, the in-
ventor who first files a patent application is entitled to the patent,
regardless of who first invented the subject matter.'" Under this
type of system, an interference proceeding to determine who is en-
titled to the patent is generally unnecessary.10 5 The difficulties in
obtaining and enforcing international patents with the existing di-
vergent patent laws has led to an effort to harmonize the world's
patent laws. The United States is considering adopting the first-to-
file system as part of an international patent harmonization
treaty.106
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") has
99. The Court clarified the standards of proof and their application. See note 11 and
accompanying text.
100. See note 10.
101. See notes 3, 5, 6, and 7.
102. Bernard R. Pravel, Why the United States Should Adopt the First-to-File Sys-
tem for Patents, 22 ST. M AY's L.J. 797, 797 (1991) (advocating adoption of a first-to-file
patent system in the United States).
103. Pravel, cited at note 102, at 797.
104. Id. The application could be filed either in the domicile country patent office or
in a foreign patent office with reciprocal priority provisions. Id. It is possible that derivation'
cases could continue to award a patent to the first to invent. See notes 129 and 130 and
accompanying text.
105. Id. at 800.
106. Id. at 801.
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been meeting periodically since 1984 to establish a multilateral
agreement on an international patent law treaty.107 Other efforts at
worldwide patent harmonization have been taking shape during
the negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT").0 5 These negotiations through the international chan-
nels have been going on for years without much success. The
United States, through the United States Trade Representative of-
fice, has been forging bilateral agreements with individual nations
regarding protection of patent rights.10 9 There are also bills before
Congress that would implement, inter alia, the first-to-file patent
system in the United States.110
There are advantages and proponents for both first-to-file and
for first-to-invent systems. One advantage often cited by first-to-
file proponents is that it would minimize delays in the administra-
tion of the patent issuance process.1 Another advantage to inven-
tors and the public is the elimination of interferences to determine
who first invented the subject matter. 1 2 Adoption of the first-to-
file system would also bring the patent laws of the United States
more in line with those of other countries. The National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, the Intellectual Property Organization,
which represents large corporate patent holders, and an association
of patent attorneys all support adoption of the first-to-file
107. W. John Moore, Reinventing Patents, NAT'L L. J., March 20, 1993, at 694.
108. Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 89, 104-11 (1993) (discussing United
States and foreign perceptions of intellectual property rights).
109. Gutterman, cited at note 108, at 111-17 (1993). For example, the North American
Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico contains some pro-
visions on protection of patent rights among the three countries.
110. Representative William J. Hughes, D-NJ, introduced H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992) that, inter alia, would implement a first-to-file patent system. On the same
day (April 9, 1992), Senator Dennis DeConcini, D-AZ, introduced a similar bill, S. 2605,
102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), in the Senate. No action was taken on these bills in the 102nd
Congress. Conferences: First-to-File System Does Not Get Approval of ABA House of Dele-
gates, 45 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 323 (1993). Senator DeConcini said that the
"drastic" changes introduced by his bill, and by harmonization in general, could lead to the
most significant changes in United States patent law since 1836. Legislation: Patent System
Harmonization Bills Are Introduced in House and Senate, 43 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. 519-20 (1992).
111. Pravel, cited at note 102, at 805. Applications are often prolonged by the Patent
Office awaiting the resolution of challenges by the Board or by the courts. The first-to-file
system would eliminate many, if not all, of these delays because there is no issue to resolve
regarding who was the first to invent the subject. Id.
112. Pravel, cited at note 102, at 805. Patent interferences cost the patent office $1




Proponents of the first-to-invent system, led by independent in-
ventors, university researchers, and a minority of patent attor-
neys,'1 ' maintain that adoption of the first-to-file system would
threaten the independent inventor and would result in simply a
race to the patent office.11 5 With an average patent application
costing $3,750,1" an independent inventor may not be able to win
the "race" to the patent office to file the application. With the
first-to-invent system, the inventor need not worry about preemp-
tion, as long as the inventor was the first to invent and was dili-
gent about reducing the invention to practice.' The inventor can
afford to wait for further development and, possibly, to attract a
source of funding before filing the application.1 18 Others question
the constitutionality of abolishing the first-to-invent system. " 9
Many argue that the United States is currently operating under
a de facto first-to-file system. Fewer than one-half of one percent
of patent applications ever go to an interference, and most of those
(about 70%) do not proceed to a final decision.120 In those that do
go to an interference, it is the junior party who bears the burden of
proof of priority of derivation. 21 To avoid bearing that burden, it
behooves the inventor to be the first to file. A study of challenged
patent applications has shown that 75% of first-filers were also
found to be first inventors.'22 Because other countries operate
under a first-to-file system, applications from United States com-
113. Skip Kaltenheuser, Keep 'First to File' Patent Rule Pending, CHRISTIAN" SCI.
MONITOR, June 7, 1993, at 19.
114. Kaltenheuser, cited at note 113, at 19.
115. Moore, cited at note 107, at 694.
116. Id.
117. See discussion at notes 5 and 6.
118. Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 St.
MARY'S L.J. 779, 783 (1991).
119. Conley, cited at note 118, at 779; Kaltenheuser, cited at note 113, at 19. "The
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl.8.
120. Conley, cited at note 118, at 790.
121. See note 26 and accompanying text.
122. Moore, cited at note 107, at 694. Only one-half of one percent of all patent appli-
cations go to interferences and about 30% of those go to final decision. See note 120 and
accompanying text. Since 75% of those that go to final decision are awarded to the senior
party, i.e., the first to file, then only about 0.0375% of all patent applications are subse-
quently awarded to a junior party challenger. There are about 100,000 applications per year.
Conley, cited at note 118, at 790. This means that there are only about 35-40 cases each
year in which a patent is awarded to the junior party.
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panies that operate internationally, and applications from foreign
entities, are filed as soon as possible to comply with the foreign
systems."2 3 It is thus argued that adoption of first-to-file would not
really impact the system, because so many are operating under a
de facto first-to-file system 2 4 It is also argued that to maintain the
first-to-invent system to benefit so few 2 5 at so much cost 1 26 is not
worth the trouble.
127
Despite the opposition to the first-to-file system, there appears
to be sufficient support to make it a reality within the next five or
six years."8s Even with implementation of the first-to-file system,
not all disputes currently associated with interferences will disap-
pear. Actions to resolve derivation (theft) and conflicting priority
dates regarding applications would still be necessary."1
9
Although the number of interferences would significantly de-
crease, it would still be necessary to retain the interference system
to deal with these issues. s° Unless the adoption of a first-to-file
system dramatically changes the way in which remaining interfer-
ences are handled, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's
decision in Price v. Symsek, regarding corroboration and burden of
proof, sets precedent for determining interference cases until the
123. In fact, almost 50% of all patent applications in this country are filed by foreign-
ers. Charles L. Gholz, How the United States Currently Handles the Interference Issues
That Will Remain in a First-to-File World, 18 Am. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 1, 9 (1990)
(discussing the various interference issues that will not be eliminated by a first-to-file
system).
124. Conley, cited at note 118, at 792. A converse argument is that because those who
primarily support first-to-file already operate in that manner, why change the system to
force everyone to do so? Id.
125. See note 122.
126. See note 112.
127. Moore, cited at note 107, at 694.
128. Global Intellectual Property Law is Dampening Piracy, CORP. LEGAL TiMES,
June 1993, at 37, 43 (quoting Edward H. Gorman, Jr. from a roundtable discussion at the
John Marshall Law School as part of the 37th Annual Conference on Developments in Intel-
lectual Property Law).
129. Gholz, cited at note 123, at 9. There are two types of derivation cases-one which
is outright theft, and one which is a result of some cooperation between companies or inven-
tors and one or more inventors claiming that the other(s) derived the invention. This second
type is the variety of derivation claim in Price v. Symsek. There are some other rare scena-
rios that could also occur that would today result in a derivation interference that would
need a vehicle for resolution under any future patent system. Id. With different countries
using different filing dates, with various addenda being filed to update original filings, and
with earlier publication under the first-to-file than under the current system, the determina-
tion of exactly which application was first filed may be a fairly common occurrence. Id. at 9,
11, 13. This, too, would require a vehicle of resolution under any future system.
130. Id. at 2, 17.
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international harmonization of patent laws, and for resolution of
remaining interference-type questions beyond that.
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